aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and … effort and the credence characteristic of the good induces experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts …

This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can … giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis effort induces experts to use their tariffs as signaling devices. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which experts survive competition by …

experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices …

between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …