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aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383298
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
Actors in various settings have been increasingly relying on algorithmic tools to support their decision-making. Much of the public debate concerning algorithms - especially the associated regulation of new technologies - rests on the assumption that humans can assess the quality of algorithms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013499021
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their … customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown … situation in which experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315945
We investigate the reaction of Italian Members of Parliament to a rigorous fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design relies on a novel randomized field experiment in collaboration with the leading Italian fact-checking company. Our results show that politicians are responsive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463503
We consider a dynamic screening model where the agent may go bankrupt due to, for example, cash constraints. We model bankruptcy as a verifiable event that occurs whenever the agent makes a per period loss. This leads to less stringent truth-telling constraints than those considered in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476119
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693
goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409200
also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012312079
Credence goods markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries between consumers and expert sellers. As a consequence, consumers are often exploited and market efficiency is threatened. However, in the digital age, it has become easy and cheap for consumers to self-diagnose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120255