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Pro bono work and trust in expert fields

Ong, David; Yang, Chun-lei - 2014 - This version: July 26, 2014

aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383298

Contesting fake news

Rehsmann, Daniel; Roussillon, Béatrice; Schweinzer, Paul - 2023

We model competition on a credence market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the underlying quality ranking's precision by releasing individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014336462

When ignorance is bliss : information asymmetries enhance prosocial behavior in dictator games

Winschel, Evguenia; Zahn, Philipp - 2014

In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To assess the effect of information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342476

Social preferences and social curiosity

Tasch, Weiwei; Houser, Daniel - 2018

Over the last two decades social preferences have been implicated in a wide variety of key economic behaviors. Here we investigate connections between social preferences and the demand for information about others' economic decisions and outcomes, which we denote "social curiosity." Our analysis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872929

Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valsek, … - 2014

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356364

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2013

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195361

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162

A dynamic theory of regulatory capture

De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021

Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609

On the sensitivity of collective action to uncertainty about climate tipping points

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2014

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point", is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249688