We study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping generations model with short-lived governments. The successive governmentsþwho care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributionsþare unable to pre-commit the future...

We survey research on the relationship between technology and trade. We begin with the old literature, which treated the state of technology as exogenous and asked how changes in technology affect the trade pattern and welfare. Recent research has attempted to endogenize technological progress...

Jagdish Bhagwati coined the phrase quid pro quo foreign investment to describe international investments made in anticipation of host country trade policy and perhaps with the intention of defusing a protectionist threat. We apply Bhagwati's notion to situations where (i) foreign investment is...

We develop a model of growth driven by successive improvements in 'General Purpose Technologies' (GPT's), such as the steam engine, electricity, or micro-electronics. Each new generation of GPT's prompts investments in complementary inputs, and impacts the economy after enough such compatible...

One of the most robust empirical regularities in the political economy of trade is the persistence of protection. This paper explains persistent protection in terms of the interaction between industry adjustment, lobbying, and the political response. Faced with a trade shock, owners of...

This paper makes the case that purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run growth process. First, we review the implications of neoclassical growth theory and the more recent theories of 'endogenous growth'. Then we discuss the empirical evidence that...

Whether governments clash in trade disputes or negotiate over trade agreements, their actions in the international arena reflect political conditions back home. Previous studies of cooperative and noncooperative trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures...

We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium. the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The...

The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the South is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North innovates new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual...