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Signalling and commitment : monetary versus inflation targeting
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013424367
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Gravity with gravitas : a solution to the border puzzle
Anderson, James E.; Van Wincoop, Eric - In: The American economic review 93 (2003) 1, pp. 170-192
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001767338
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Households, markets and public choice
Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2014 - This Version: August 2014
favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399075
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Gradual portfolio adjustment : implications for global equity portfolios and returns
Bacchetta, Philippe; Van Wincoop, Eric - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011670842
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How big are potential welfare gains from international risksharing?
Van Wincoop, Eric - In: Journal of international economics 47 (1999) 1, pp. 109-135
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001395923
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Higher order expectations in asset pricing
Bacchetta, Philippe; Van Wincoop, Eric - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003640578
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Imperfect competition, general equilibrium and unemployment
Gersbach, Hans; Schniewind, Achim - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 32 (2008) 5, pp. 1381-1398
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003732532
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Can information heterogeneity explain the exchange rate determinantion puzzle?
Bacchetta, Philippe; Van Wincoop, Eric - In: The American economic review 96 (2006) 3, pp. 552-576
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003349264
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On the unstable relationship between exchange rates and macroeocnomic fundamentals
Bacchetta, Philippe; Van Wincoop, Eric - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848457
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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
Gersbach, Hans - 2009
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539