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Regulating stock externalities
Gerlagh, Reyer; Heijmans, Roweno - 2018
-consistent policy rules that implement the stochastic first best as long as a future market exists. We apply our theory to carbon …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011939765
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Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
Rahi, Rohit; Zigrand, Jean-Pierre - In: Journal of economic theory 177 (2018), pp. 558-593
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012025726
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Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers
Kolmar, Martin (contributor); Meier, Volker (contributor) - 2005
In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002756268
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Price and quantity regulation in general equlibrium
Kelly, David L. - In: Journal of economic theory 125 (2005) 1, pp. 36-60
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003228903
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Endogenous public information and welfare
Vives, Xavier - 2011
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259934
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Information-constrained optima with retrading : an externality and its market-based solution
Kilenthong, Weerachart T.; Townsend, Robert M. - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 3, pp. 1042-1077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261029
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Endogenous public information and welfare
Vives, Xavier - 2011
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832
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Risk taking, limited liability and the competition of bank regulators
Sinn, Hans-Werner - 2001
Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400902
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Overfunding and signaling effects of herding behavior in crowdfunding
Kapounek, Svatopluk; Kučerová, Zuzana - 2019
The paper employs a dynamic market-wide herding behavior measure of 117,166 lending-based campaigns in 119 online … show that herding behavior plays an important signaling role in reducing opportunity costs if the auction does not receive … enough monetary bids. Additionally, our threshold models identify significant herding behavior after funding goals are raised …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138907
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Competitive experimentation with private information : the survivor's curse
Moscarini, Giuseppe; Squintani, Francesco - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 2, pp. 639-660
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003972853