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Gersbach, Hans; Hummel, Noemi - 2009

We propose a development-compatible refunding system designed to mitigate climate change. Industrial countries pay an initial fee into a global fund. Each country chooses its national carbon tax. Part of the global fund is refunded to developing and industrial countries, in proportion to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888042

Emission taxes and the design of refunding schemes

Gersbach, Hans; Requate, Tilman - 2000

We examine how emission taxes should be refunded to firms in order to create optimal incentives to invest in cleaner technologies. Since refunds cannot be made dependent on investments, an alternative way is to give back taxes to firms according to market shares. We show that universally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781603

Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

Gersbach, Hans - 2009

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937264

Information markets, elections and contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2011

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663

Modeling two Macro policy instruments : interest rates and aggregate capital requirements

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2011 - This Version: September 2011

We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital requirement can be used as a … macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should be … banker. Second, setting aggregate bank-capital requirements is separated from monetary policy. -- central banks ; banking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009307956

When inefficiency begets efficiency

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2004

Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399478

Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2001

We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419080

Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2001

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419124

Forward guidance contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Liu, Yulin - 2015 - This version: May 2015

We examine "Forward Guidance Contracts", which make central bankers' utility contingent on the precision of interest-rate forecasts for some time. Such Forward Guidance Contracts are a exible commitment device and can improve economic performance when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010528970