aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and … effort and the credence characteristic of the good induces experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts …

experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices …

Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce … "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three … selection and fixed effects regressions support the model's predictions and show that causality goes from good experts to fair …