Showing 1 - 10 of 12
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693
We study the impact of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409200
. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224509
framework. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic … uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012311343
framework. We test the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic … uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012312079
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315945
In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013450739
Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014391609
In markets for credence goods - such as health care or repair services - fraudulent behavior by better informed experts is a common problem. Our model studies how four common features shape experts' provision behavior in credence goods markets: (i) diagnostic uncertainty of experts; (ii)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014391621
Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127565