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Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - 2014 - This Version: August 2014

favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399075

Balanced growth despite Uzawa

Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan; Oberfield, Ezra; … - 2016

Evidence for the United States suggests balanced growth despite falling investment-good prices and less than unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This is inconsistent with the Uzawa Growth Theorem. We extend Uzawa.s theorem to show that introducing human capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434429

Political institutions and policy outcomes : what are the stylized facts?

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido Enrico - 2001

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 and onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398379

Transparency and credibility : monetary policy with unobservable goals

Faust, Jon; Svensson, Lars E. O. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000659392

The scope of cooperation : values and incentives

Tabellini, Guido Enrico (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003641773

Moderating political extremism : single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule

Bordignon, Massimo; Tabellini, Guido Enrico - 2009

We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824705

Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

Gersbach, Hans - 2009

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937264

Information markets, elections and contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - 2011

problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts … stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663

Modeling two Macro policy instruments : interest rates and aggregate capital requirements

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2011 - This Version: September 2011

We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital requirement can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should be adjusted when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009307956