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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489403
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Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments : experimental evidence
Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2022
We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013167956
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Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2021
Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312
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Spite vs. risk : explaining overbidding
Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw - 2019
In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and spite can be used to rationalize deviations from risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
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Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation
Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor … quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given … the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038
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Buy-It-Now" or "Sell-It-Now" auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms
Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2015
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406561
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Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
Ewerhart, Christian; Quartieri, Federico - 2013
unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
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The intricacy of adapting to climate change : flood protection as a local public goods game
Bondarev, Anton; Hintermann, Beat; Krysiak, Frank C.; … - 2017
We study adaptation to climate change in a federalist setting. To protect themselves against an increase in flood risk, regional governments choose among adaptation measures that vary with respect to their costs, the level of protection they offer, and the presence and nature of spillovers to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616351
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
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An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030