Policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate rather than alleviate climate change (green paradox). In a two-period three-country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second period. When that cap is tightened the...

We study the incidence of carbon-reduction and green-energy promotion policies in an open fossil-fuel importing general equilibrium economy. The focus is on mixed price-based or quantity-based policies. Instruments directed toward promoting green energy are shown to reduce also carbon emissions...

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from...

In recent years, differences between traditional and green parties have been leveled with respect to climate protection. We show that this partial convergence in party platforms can be explained by international climate agreements, effectively reducing greenhouse gas emissions. We set up a...

The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of "Nash" coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general...

Scientific expertise suggests that mitigating extreme world-wide climate change damages requires avoiding increases in the world mean temperature exceeding 2° Celsius. To achieve the two degree target, the cumulated global emissions must not exceed some limit, the so-called global carbon...