We consider income-source-dependent tax evasion and show that this is a generalization of the well-known endowment effect. We show that loss aversion, moral costs, mental accounting, and risk preferences play a key role in explaining key features of source-dependent tax evasion. We provide...

A group of decision makers simultaneously make contributions towards a green fund that reduces the future probability of a climate catastrophe. We derive the theoretical predictions of the effects on contributions arising from 'behavioral parameters' such as loss aversion and present-bias;...

We measure individual-level loss aversion using three incentivized, representative surveys of the U.S. population (combined N = 3,000). We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant, with many participants accepting negative-expected-value gambles. This is counter to earlier...

Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale interdisciplinary meta-analysis, to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported during the past couple of decades. We...

We study the pattern of correlations across a large number of behavioral regularities, with the goal of creating an empirical basis for more comprehensive theories of decision-making. We elicit 21 behaviors using an incentivized survey on a representative sample (n = 1;000) of the U.S....

We use four incentivized representative surveys to study the endowment effect for lotteries in 4,000 U.S. adults. We replicate the standard finding of an endowment effect-the divergence between Willingness to Accept (WTA) and Willingness to Pay (WTP), but document three new findings. First, we...

We use the trust and the dictator games to explore the effects of religious identity on trust, trustworthiness, prosociality, and conditional reciprocity within a beliefs-based model. We provide a novel and rigorous theoretical model to derive the relevant predictions, which are then tested in...

We consider a private sector job that offers high-powered incentives and two public sector jobs that produce an identical public good, but only one of them offers opportunities for corruption. Our theoretical predictions relate occupation and effort choices, in these three jobs, to preferences...