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Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats

Frey, Bruno S. (contributor); Osterloh, Margit (contributor) - 2005

. Agency theory’s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002572375

Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013

findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267

A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166

Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting

Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014

compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants

Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964

Strategic delegation in experimental markets

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566

Do firms gain from managerial overconfidence? : the role of severance pay

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2022

We analyze the effects of optimism and overconfidence when the manager's compensation package includes severance pay and the CEO has bargaining power. We find that optimism does not affect incentive pay but increases severance pay with a negative effect on profit. Overconfidence, on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255972

Merger without cost advantages

Huck, Steffen (contributor); Konrad, Kai A. (contributor); … - 2005

The seminal paper by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) showed that merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the firms are involved in the merger. However, many strategic aspects matter for firm competition such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002757958

Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507904

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764