Similar Search Results

Colluding on excluding

Argenton, Cédric - In: European economic review : EER 113 (2019), pp. 194-206

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012238026

Special issue on market competition, conflict and collusion

d'Aspremont, Claude - In: European economic review : EER 27 (1985) 1, pp. 1-114

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002050815

Pricing by international airline alliances : a retrospective study using supplementary foreign-carrier fare data

Brueckner, Jan K.; Singer, Ethan - 2019

This study provides further empirical evidence on pricing by international airline alliances. The paper covers a long sample period, which runs from 1997 to 2016, and it supplements the usual USDOT fare data with confidential fare data reported by the foreign alliance partners of US carriers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022210

How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion : a machine learning approach

Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2022

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free … cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013418834

Industry structure and pricing over the business cycle

Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad - 2014

We consider the interaction between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and examine how this interaction is affected by demand fluctuations. Our model gives rise to procyclical entry, prices, and price-cost margins, although the average price in the market can be countercyclical if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367376

Price equilibrium with selling constraints

Moraga-González, José Luis; Watanabe, Makoto - 2023

This paper studies how selling constraints, which refer to the inability of firms to attend to all the buyers who want to inspect their products, affect the equilibrium price and social welfare. We show that the price that maximizes social welfare is greater than the marginal cost. This is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014320135

Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850139

Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion

Normann, Hans-Theo - In: European economic review : EER 53 (2009) 4, pp. 461-480

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854513

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Françoise - 2010

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974150

Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2010

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members. -- cartel formation ; multi-market contact ; leniency programs ; international antitrust cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955227

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last