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Experiments and simulations on day-to-day route choice-behaviour
Selten, Reinhard; Schreckenberg, Michael; Pitz, Thomas; … - 2003
The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506494
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Measuring agents' reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2010
behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing 'overreactions' to public signals. We present an experiment based on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937803
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The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2010
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697819
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Cross-racial envy and underinvestment in South Africa
Haile, Daniel (contributor); Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (contributor) - 2006
Trust games are employed to investigate the effect of heterogeneity in income and race on cooperation in South Africa. The amount of socio-economic information available to the subjects about their counterparts is varied. No significant behavioural differences are observed, when no such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301019
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Reciprocity and emotions when reciprocators know each other
Reuben, Ernesto (contributor);  … - 2006
This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301137
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Lies in disguise : a theoretical analysis of cheating
Dufwenberg, Martin <Jr>; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016
We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011566513
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Does policy communication during COVID work?
Coibion, Olivier; Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Weber, Michael - 2020
by the Federal Reserve, stimulus measures, as well as recommendations from health officials. This experiment allows us to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231514
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind … ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by … the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398368
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Appropriating the commons : a theoretical explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398786
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Self-confidence and strategic behavior
Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo; Ven, Jeroen van de - 2013
strategically optimal. This behavior is consistent with the equilibrium of the corresponding signaling game. Based on the theory of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223063