Showing 1 - 3 of 3
, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781523
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231626
game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781529