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Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
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Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions : the GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399147
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The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400807
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The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions
Holmberg, Pär; Newbery, David M. G. - 2009
electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the …-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and … restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions. -- Wholesale electricity markets ; supply function equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003895566
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Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing
Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - 2015
behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518807
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Conspiracy against the public : an experiment on collusion
Johnsen, Åshild A.; Kvaløy, Ola - 2018
-based social preferences suggest that negative externalities make collusion harder to sustain than predicted by standard economic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925886
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A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco - 2021
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
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Fines, leniency and rewards in antitrust : [an experiment]
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - 2008
law enforcement. -- Cartels ; Collusion ; Coordination ; Competition policy ; Deterrence ; Desistance ; Law enforcement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003736705