The optimal social cost of carbon is in general equilibrium proportional to GDP if utility is logarithmic, production is Cobb-Douglas, depreciation in 100% every period, climate damages as fraction of production decline exponentially with the stock of atmospheric carbon, and fossil fuel...

This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...

We show that several of the most important economic models of climate change produce climate dynamics inconsistent with the current crop of models in climate science. First, most economic models exhibit far too long a delay between an impulse of CO2 emissions and warming. Second, few economic...

We analyse optimal abatement and carbon pricing strategies under a variety of economic, temperature and damage risks. Economic growth, convex damages and temperature-dependent risks of climatic tipping points lead to higher growth rates of carbon prices, but gradual resolution of uncertainty...

We study climate change in a model with a carbon-intensive and a green sector, each subject to stochastic sectoral productivity shocks, and show how the underlying economic structure affects the risk-adjusted discount rate and the climate risk premium in the social cost of carbon (SCC)....

Temperature responses and optimal climate policies depend crucially on the choice of a particular climate model. To illustrate, the temperature responses to given emission reduction paths implied by the climate modules of the well-known integrated assessments models DICE, FUND and PAGE are...