This paper surveys the literature on the implications of international capital mobility for national tax policies. Our main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic...

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Bei steigenden Einkommen führt die "kalte Progression" des Einkommensteuertarifs für den Steuerzahler dazu, dass seine Einkommensteuer automatisch stärker zunimmt als das Einkommen selbst. Diese "heimlichen Steuererhöhungen" werden 2008 und 2009 infolge der nominalen Lohnerhöhungen...

In this study, we analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policies in China during the period 1978-2013. We find that the cyclicality of local government spending in China significantly affects the cyclicality of total government spending. By employing both time-series and province-level panel data,...

This paper considers the implications of asymmetric information in capital markets for entrepreneurial entry and tax policy. In many countries, governments subsidize the creation of new firms. One possible justification for these subsidies is that capital markets for the financing of new firms...

Verminderte Steuereinnahmen und die defizitäre Lage der öffentlichen Haushalte haben eine Diskussion über Steuererhöhungen ausgelöst. Dass die vorgesehenen Maßnahmen ökonomisch sinnvoll und in der aktuellen Wirtschaftslage angemessen sind, bezweifelt Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest, Universität...

In this paper we introduce flexible majority decision rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal made by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public projects. In many cases, the combination of the...

We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends...