A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm s success, but neither...

The paper proposes a simple equilibrium model of venture capital, entrepreneurship and innovation. Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise start-up entrepreneurs and thereby add value to new firms. The paper demonstrates how a productive and active VC industry boosts innovation...

The paper develops a unified general equilibrium model including savings with overlapping generations, investment and search unemployment. Long-run analytical results for the small open economy identify capital accumulation as a prime transmission channel. The effects of integration on...

Start-up entrepreneurs are often commercially inexperienced. In giving managerial advice, venture capitalists can importantly enhance the success of innovative but highly risky ventures. The supply of experienced venture capitalists is not easily increased, however. When the rate of business...

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and...