This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue....

Credit rationing in the presence of asset inequality affects production and trade pattern in this paper, but not in the conventional way. A Ricardian general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous levels of asset ownership is developed to show that more equal asset distribution may contract...

The well known Pareto criterion used in the context of efficiency and welfare has to do with absolute changes whereas in every domain of economic behaviour inequality or relative changes has become a major concern. We propose an inequality-preserving or distribution neutral Pareto criterion-the...

We study the implications of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly in which firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations, without and with credit rationing, i.e., with a binding credit limit. When there is credit...

Firm heterogeneity is mostly discussed in the literature from the viewpoint of productivity differential. In contrast this paper recognizes wealth heterogeneity as an important factor that results in firm heterogeneity. The issue of wealth heterogeneity and export incentive through credit market...

We model the interaction between the informal credit market and the act of tax collection by the government; in presence and functioning of the informal credit market, the agents (the tax paying firms) engage in false or sham litigation and deferred tax payments. During the litigation period...