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This paper develops a new equilibrium model of two-sided search where agents have multiple attributes and general payoff functions. The model can be applied to several substantive issues. Here we use it to provide a novel understanding of the separate effects of equal opportunities for women in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227223
This paper develops a model of search on the labour market with training. The model reveals how the tax system can restore the social optimum if the Hosio s condition is not satisfied in the private equilibrium. Furthermore, the effects are explored of a second-best reform from average to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781502
We construct a simple equilibrium search model in which workers accumulate information about previously met employment contacts. We term the latter search capital. Here search capital (partially) insures workers against adverse shocks. The model provides a theory of job-to-job transitions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009500750
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We build an analytically and computationally tractable stochastic equilibrium model of unemployment in heterogeneous labor markets. Facing search frictions within markets and reallocation frictions between markets, workers endogenously separate from employment and endogenously reallocate between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691688
The objective of this paper is to construct and quantitatively assess an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search and general human capital accumulation. In the model workers enter the labour market with different abilities and firms differ in their productivities. Wages are dispersed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009659316
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We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273921