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This paper incorporates competition for fiscal transfers (or, equivalently, rent seeking from state coffers) into a standard general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy. The government generates tax revenues, but then each selfinterested individual agent...
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clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011513996
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total … departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The … antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012
It is known that anti-social redistributive activities (rent seeking, tax evasion, corruption, violation of property rights, delay of socially beneficial reforms, etc) hurt the macroeconomy. But it is less known what is the role of government size as a determinant of such activities. We use data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002746122
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allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985850
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The existing literature has shown that special interest groups can have both growth enhancing and retarding effects on an economy. In either case it is always assumed that the nature of the special interest groups remains constant over time. The hypothesis of this paper is that a dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009766682