I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be...

A perceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less wage moderation are likely to promote bargaining co-ordination and social pacts in the EMU. But such co-ordination is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it...

The European experience suggests that the efforts made to achieve an efficient trade-off between monetary policy and prudential supervision ultimately failed. The severity of the global crisis have pushed central banks to explore innovative tools-within or beyond their statutory...

Why did European policy-makers introduce the Banking Union? Which are its main features? How does it affect banks and their customers? This book tries to answer these questions, by providing a clear description of the building blocks of the Banking Union, and by showing that several issues...

The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and,...

Erläuterung der Begriffe Systemrelevanz, Systemrisiko und Too Big to Fail -- Messung von Systemrisiko von Banken -- Diskussion der Regulierung systemrelevanter Finanzinstitute in der Europäischen Union.

We examine the fiscal footprint of macroprudential policy in euro area countries arising through the bond market channel (Reis, 2021). Using local projections, we estimate impulse responses of the fiscal balance to an unexpected tightening in macroprudential capital regulation. Our findings...