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Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
Morath, Florian - 2011
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011776
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Efficiency, welfare, and political competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277
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Think global, act local! : a mechanism for global commons and mobile firms
Ahlvik, Lassi; Liski, Matti - 2019
It is tricky to design local regulations on global externalities, especially so if firms are mobile. We show that when … costs and outside options are firms' private information, the threat of firm relocation leads to local regulations that are … to firms that can efficiently limit the externality. The optimal mechanism supplements this strict local regulation with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011996399
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Optimal design of intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information
Huber, Bernd; Runkel, Marco - 2003
This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507744
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The intricacy of adapting to climate change : flood protection as a local public goods game
Bondarev, Anton; Hintermann, Beat; Krysiak, Frank C.; … - 2017
We study adaptation to climate change in a federalist setting. To protect themselves against an increase in flood risk, regional governments choose among adaptation measures that vary with respect to their costs, the level of protection they offer, and the presence and nature of spillovers to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616351
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Common agency equilibria with discrete mechanisms and discrete types
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2001
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
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Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission
Cassar, Lea - 2016
mechanism i) has a "double distortion" in the mission; ii) does not exclude low-types agents; and iii) can be implemented …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
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Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection
Gary-Bobo, Robert; Trannoy, Alain - 2013
We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754597
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Private information and optimal infant industry protection
Ravikumar, B.; Riezman, Raymond Glenn; Zhang, Yuzhe - 2022
transitioned to low cost is private information. We use a mechanism-design approach to induce the industry to reveal its true cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013206084
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Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen
Lang, Matthias - 2016
Consider legal uncertainty as uncertainty about the legality of a specific action. In particular, suppose that the threshold of legality is uncertain. I show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare. Legal uncertainty changes deterrence in opposite directions. The probability of conviction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557794