This paper studies the formation of self-enforcing global environmental agreements in a world economy with international trade and two groups of countries that differ with respect to fuel demand and environmental damage. It investigates whether the signatories’ threat to embargo (potential)...

A small open economy produces a consumer good along with green and black energy and imports fossil fuel for black-energy production at an uncertain world market price. Efficient risk management requires curbing fuel consumption, and hence carbon emissions, when consumers are prudent. Moreover,...

A small open economy produces a consumer good along with green and black energy and imports fossil fuel for black-energy production at an uncertain world market price. Efficient risk management requires curbing fuel consumption, and hence carbon emissions, when consumers are prudent. Moreover,...

A small open economy produces a consumer good, green and black energy, and imports fossil fuel at an uncertain price. Unregulated competitive markets are shown to be inefficient. The implied market failures are due to the agents' attitudes toward risk, to risk shifting and the uniform price for...

Carbon tariffs are one prominently discussed environmental policy. The proponents stress the carbon tariffs' ability to mitigate the potential negative effect of environmental-friendly production on competitiveness, to avoid carbon leakage and to reduce world carbon emissions. We analyze the...

Unilateral climate policy suffers from carbon leakage, i.e. the (partial) offset of the initial emission reduction by increases in other countries. Different than most typically discussed climate policies, degrowth not only aims at reducing the fossil fuel use in an economy, but rather at a...

We develop a multi-sector structural trade model with emissions from production and a con- stant elasticity of fossil fuel supply function to simulate the consequences of unilateral withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. Taking into account both direct and leakage effects, we find that a US...

International trade is highly imbalanced both in terms of values and in terms of embodied carbon emissions. We show that the persistent current value trade imbalance patterns contribute to a higher level of global emissions compared to a world of balanced international trade. Specifically, we...

The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of Nash coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general...

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of selfenforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...