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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004

Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877

Glass ceiling in research : evidence from a national program in Uruguay : prepared for the Institutions for Development Department

Bukstein, Daniel; Gandelman, Néstor - 2017

This paper presents evidence that female researchers have 7.1 percentage points lower probability of being accepted into the largest national research support program in Uruguay than male researchers. They also have lower research productivity than their male counterparts. Differences in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011661330

Flexicurity, wage dynamics and inequality over the life-cycle

Bingley, Paul; Cappellari, Lorenzo; … - 2011

We investigate the relationship between life-cycle wages and flexicurity in Denmark. We separate permanent from transitory wages and characterise flexicurity using membership of unemployment insurance funds. We find that flexicurity is associated with lower wage growth heterogeneity over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273938

On the role of learning, human capital, and performance incentives for wages

Camargo, Braz; Lange, Fabian; Pastorino, Elena - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013365994

Environmental policy under ambiguity

Vinokur, Leon - 2009

The aim of this paper is to extend existing literature on carbon allowance allocation, investigating the impact of uncertainty and ambiguity, due to the lack of future Environmental policy, on the total production in the market. Specifically, we show that an increase in uncertainty has no effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814728

Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task

Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015

We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines "real" efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518803

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105

The principal-agent matching market

Dam, Kaniska - 2003

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507906

Scholarships or student loans? : subsidizing higher education in the presence of moral hazard

Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2003

Student loans, even income-contingent ones, are not optimal. Potential university students with the appropriate characteristics should be offered a scholarship, dependent on both need and merit. The award of the scholarship should be conditional on the choice of university degree, but students...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508011

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants

Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964

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