A standard result in the optimal taxation literature is that, when agents differ in market ability and the government aims at redistributing from high- to low-skilled agents by means of an optimal nonlinear labor income tax and a set of commodity taxes, an optimally designed commodity tax...

We construct a general equilibrium model of a two-country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital, and provide an imported public consumption good. At Nash equilibrium, when the public good is under-provided, (i) a country with a large GDP, has a large Nash...

When a poublic good ist excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study the role of prices onexcludable public goods using an extension of the Stiglitz-Sternversion of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. Our discussionincludes both the case where the public good...

Using an OLG model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we investigate whether an optimally designed set of public pension transfers can usefully supplement a nonlinear labor income tax as a welfare-enhancing policy instrument. We consider a Mirrleesian setting where agents' skills are...