I analyze the optimal design of banking supervision in the presence of cross-border lending. Cross-border lending could imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross-border contagion effects could turn out to be...

Using a difference-in-differences approach and relying on conftdential supervisory data and an unique proprietary data set available at the European Central Bank related to the 2016 EU-wide stress test, this paper presents novel empirical evidence that supervisory scrutiny associated to stress...

Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening - especially for mortgages - is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for...

A perceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less wage moderation are likely to promote bargaining co-ordination and social pacts in the EMU. But such co-ordination is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it...

We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship...

The Banking Euro Area Stress Test (BEAST) is a large scale semi-structural model developed to assess the resilience of the euro area banking system from a macroprudential perspective. The model combines the dynamics of a high number of euro area banks with that of the euro area economies. It...

The paper inspects the credit impact of policy instruments that are commonly applied to contain systemic risk. It employs detailed information on the use of capital-based, borrowerbased and liquidity-based instruments in 28 European Union countries in 1995-2017 and a macroeconomic panel setup....

The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and,...