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We study the impact of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage, physicians have an incentive to cheat by inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409200
In markets for credence goods sellers are better informed than their customers about the quality that yields the highest surplus from trade. This paper studies second-degree price-discrimination in such markets. It shows that discrimination regards the amount of advice offered to customers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354736
. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220084
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220097
lab experiments. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty increases the rate of incorrect service … provision and leads to less trade, thus reducing efficiency. In theory, insurance also increases the provision of incorrect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237208
In markets where transactions are governed by contractual incompleteness, revealed intentions to evade taxes may affect market performance. We experimentally examine the impact of tax evasion attempts on the performance of credence goods markets, where contractual incompleteness results from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237657
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693
We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736618
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard - the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193289
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733215