We derive exact conditions relating the distributions of firm productivity, sales, output, and markups to the form of demand in monopolistic competition. Applications include a new “CREMR” demand function (Constant Revenue Elasticity of Marginal Revenue): it is necessary and sufficient for...

Die Messung der effektiven Steuerbelastung rentabler Investitionen ist mit zahlreichen methodischen Problemen verbunden. Diese lassen sich zum Teil mit einem auf Devereux und Griffith zurückgehenden Modell überwinden. Basierend auf ihrem Ansatz wird eine Maßgröße für die effektive...

Custom software is distinct from other types of capital in that it is non-rival—once a firm makes an investment in custom software, it can be used simultaneously across its many establishments. Using confidential US Census data, we document that while firms with more establishments are more...

Die schwere Wirtschaftskrise 2008/09 hatte substanzielle Auswirkungen auf die Innovationstätigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft. Die Umsatz- und Gewinneinbußen führten zu einem kräftigen Rückgang der Innovationsausgaben. Davon waren primär Investitionen für neue Produkte und verbesserte...

This paper develops a theory of firm selection and growth and embeds it into an international trade framework of balanced growth. I assume that firm-level growth is the result of idiosyncratic productivity improvements while there is continuous arrival of new potential producers. Firms can also...

Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient...

The paper develops a four-step framework to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In the first step, an estimate of the impact of the merger on the market price needs to be derived. Subsequent, the second step of the framework has to assess whether such a predicted price increase would be...

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...