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Contracts offered by bureaucrats
Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2013
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212358
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Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
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Trust and contracts : empirical evidence
D'Acunto, Francesco; Xie, Jin; Yao, Jiaquan - 2020
Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others … over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318377