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We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of...
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We develop a behavioral macroeconomic model in which agents use simple but biased rules to forecast future output and inflation. This model generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism ("Animal Spiritsʺ) that are generated by the correlation of biased beliefs. We contrast the dynamics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003763301
We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539
In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937264
Capitalism is characterized by booms and busts. Periods of strong growth in output alternate with periods of declines in economic growth. Every macro-economic theory should attempt to explain these endemic business cycle movements. In this paper I present two paradigms that attempt to explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008806543
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I distinguish two types of macroeconomic models. The first type are top-down models in which some or all agents are capable of understanding the whole picture and use this superior information to determine their optimal plans. The second type are bottom-up models in which all agents experience...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965858
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663