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Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions? : evidence from panel data

Dreher, Axel (contributor); Sturm, Jan-Egbert (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003377296

The costs of favoritism : is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003948233

Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? : testing the effects of delegating powers

Dreher, Axel (contributor); Voigt, Stefan (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003688912

Politics and IMF conditionality

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - 2013 - This version: June 2013

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765008

Membership has its privileges : the effect of membership in international organizations on FDI

Dreher, Axel; Mikosch, Heiner; Voigt, Stefan - 2010

We argue that membership in International Organizations (IOs) is an important determinant of FDI inflows. To the extent that membership restricts a country from pursuing policies that are harmful to investors, it can signal low political risk. Using data over the 1971-2005 period, we find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699691

Buying votes and international organizations : the dirty work-hypothesis

Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin; Rosendorff, B. Peter; … - 2018

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927941