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Hefeker, Carsten - 2001

What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398004

Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty : substitutes or complements?

Hefeker, Carsten; Zimmer, Blandine - 2011

The paper examines the optimal combination of central bank independence and conservatism in the presence of uncertain … bank's degree of inde-pendence and conservatism so as to minimise society's loss function. We find that the optimal … combination between independence and conservatism is not necessarily characterised by substitutability. When uncertainty about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010174

Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty

Hefeker, Carsten; Zimmer, Blandine - 2014

We study how the optimal degree of conservatism relates to decision-making procedures in a Monetary Policy Committee … (MPC). In our framework, central bank conservatism is required to attenuate the volatility of monetary decisions generated … by the presence of uncertainty about the committee member' output objective. We show how this need for conservatism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010391838

Stable money and central bank independence : implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany

Hefeker, Carsten - 2019

Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945 but that there was also initial resistance to both among German experts and officials. This is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119851

Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with exit option

Hefeker, Carsten; Neugart, Michael - 2015

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492336

Common monetary policy with asymmetric shocks

Gros, Daniel; Hefeker, Carsten - 2002

What policy objective should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union pursue? Should it base its decisions on the EU-wide average of inflation and growth or should it instead focus on (appropriately weighted) national welfare losses based on national rates of inflation and growth?...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409772

IMF surveillance and financial markets : a political economy analysis

Fratzscher, Marcel; Reynaud, Julien - 2010

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003976542

Structural reforms and the enlargement of monetary union

Hefeker, Carsten - 2003

The paper addresses the question what effects the enlargement of a monetary union will have on necessary structural reforms in the (low distortion) member countries and the (high distortion) candidate countries. While monetary union lowers reforms in the candidate countries, members of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509539

Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions

Berger, Helge; Hefeker, Carsten; Schöb, Ronnie - 2001

of central bank conservatism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397779

Uncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary union

Hefeker, Carsten (contributor); Zimmer, Blandine (contributor) - 2008

The paper examines the monetary-fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. We first show that monetary uncertainty disciplines fiscal policymakers and thereby reduces taxes, average inflation and output distortions. However, as more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003749682