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Information aggregation in democratic mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2016 - This version: January 22, 2016

private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by … communication among all citizens prior to voting. Finally, we outline several applications of the mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444451

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937264

Fiscal constitutions

Gersbach, Hans - 1999

In this paper we examine how individuals should be treated with respect to taxes, subsidies and agenda setting in constitutions in order to obtain efficient allocations of public goods and to limit tax distortions. We show that if public goods are socially desirable, the simple majority rule as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781718

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440