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Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850139

Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2010

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members. -- cartel formation ; multi-market contact ; leniency programs ; international antitrust cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955227

Policy innovations, political preferences, and cartel prosecutions

Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282

Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434582

Vertical integration and downstream collusion

Biancini, Sara; Ettinger, David - 2016

We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482885

Transparency and tacit collusion in a differentiated market

Schultz, Christian - 2002

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from underbutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409987

Collusion by algorithm: the role of unobserved actions

Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander - 2022

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093034

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866

Preferential trade liberalization with endogenous cartel discipline : implications for welfare and optimal trade policies

Agnosteva, Delina; Syropoulos, Constantinos; Yotov, Yoto - 2020

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third …-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by … the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which links strategically markets that are seemingly unrelated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012287796

Multimarket linkages, cartel discipline and trade costs

Agnosteva, Delina; Syropoulos, Constantinos; Yotov, Yoto V. - 2017

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781965