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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
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Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, May 2004
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2004
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449658
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Flexicurity, wage dynamics and inequality over the life-cycle
Bingley, Paul; Cappellari, Lorenzo; … - 2011
We investigate the relationship between life-cycle wages and flexicurity in Denmark. We separate permanent from transitory wages and characterise flexicurity using membership of unemployment insurance funds. We find that flexicurity is associated with lower wage growth heterogeneity over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009273938
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EVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation
Ponssard, Jean-Pierre; Larmande, François - 2004
Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90's, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions ist...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450490
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Differential prize taxation and structural discrimination in contests
Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2012
This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540773
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Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task
Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015
We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines "real" efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518803
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Teams and tournaments in relational contracts
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond - 2014
We analyze relational contracts for a set of agents when either (a) only aggregate output or (b) individual outputs are observable. A team incentive scheme, where each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold, is optimal in case (a). The team's efficiency may increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010349864
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The efficacy of tournaments for non-routine team tasks
Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2021
Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but … also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012597694
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The persistent effect of competition on prosociality
Kosse, Fabian; Rajan, Ranjita; Tincani, Michela M. - 2023
literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014431358
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964