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We construct a political equilibrium in which employers and labour unions bargain over labour contracts, wage-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be accepted by the majority of voters. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409824
This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003299325
What determines the structure of labour market institutions? This paper argues that common explanations based on rent sharing are incomplete; unions, job protection, and egalitarian pay structures may have as much to do with social insurance of otherwise uninsurable risks as with rent sharing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009786721
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003462223
We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523762
Promises are prevalent in many economic environments. They offer the opportunity to honor future obligations when promise keeping is observable. This paper studies the value of transparency and asks whether promises still work if such transparency is missing. We focus on the context of campaign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231501
This paper studies how political competition can lead candidates to strategically increase the salience of specific issues, in order to influence voting decisions of marginal groups, with non trivial consequences for turnout rates. In my setup issues differ in their divisiveness, to be defined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008807631
Immigration control-related audits and their resulting sanctions are not solely determined by impartial enforcement of laws and regulations. They are also determined by the incentives faced by vote-maximizing congressmen, agents acting on their behalf, and workers likely to compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533971
in line with our theory. -- redistribution ; welfare spending ; information ; income ; voting ; political economics …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009314546
Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that under divided government a US state is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229882