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Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2021

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated …). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in … prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599052

More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015

In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303

Utilities included : split incentives in commercial electricity contracts

Jessoe, Katrina; Papineau, Maya; Rapson, David - 2019

This paper quantifies a tenant-side "split incentives" problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers … previous split incentives papers, and is robust when exposed to several opportunities to fail. The electricity reduction in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012031116

Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Huffman, David; Raymond, Collin - 2023

rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014309731

Non-common priors, incentives, and promotions : the role of learning

Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - 2023

We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070

Financial constraints and moral hazard : the case of franchising

Fan, Ying; Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine - 2013

Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210716

Contracts and Inequity aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - 2002

conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514018

Ethnic fractionalization, governance and loan defaults in Africa

Andrianova, Svetlana; Baltagi, Badi H.; Demetriades, … - 2014

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010424751

Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information

Malcomson, James M. - 2015 - This version: July 24, 2015

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994