Similar Search Results

Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

Lamprecht, Julian; Thum, Marcel - 2022

We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents, whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332120

Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply : analysis and an example

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2011

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011305

Individual and developmental differences in the relationship of preferences and theory of mind

Leipold, Kristina; Vetter, Nora C.; Dittrich, Marcus; … - 2012

Theory of mind and individual preferences are important determinants in social decision making. The current study … examined in a large sample whether being a cooperative preference type is related with better theory of mind skills …. Furthermore, by testing adolescents and adults, we examined the impact of age on this relation. Theory of mind is measured in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689352

Why not in your backyard? : on the location and size of a public facility

Bellettini, Giorgio (contributor); Kempf, Hubert (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003662234

Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019

We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Why do committees work?

Breitmoser, Yves; Valasek, Justin - 2023

We report on the results of an experiment designed to disentangle behavioral biases in information aggregation of committees. Subjects get private signals about the state of world, send binary messages, and finally vote under either majority or unanimity rules. Committee decisions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442413

Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters

Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2016

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444079

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

A paradox of coalition building in public good provision

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Hattori, Keisuke - 2021

This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision of global public goods. We show that the possibility of future interstate (partial) coordination may hinder the current adoption of better technology by a country outside the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643560

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last