We argue a holdout is not a destructive investor behaviour but a rational investment decision. This investment decision is characterised by the mean-variance approach. We investigate intercreditor conflict by diverse portfolio structure. We demonstrate that at some point during the Greek (2012)...

We analyze domestic, foreign, and central banks holdings of public debt for 31 countries for the period of 1989-2022, applying panel regressions and quantile analysis. We conclude that an increase in sovereign risk raises the share of domestic banks' portfolio of public debt and reduces the...

Based on the observation of an unabated trend towards higher social spending ratios in advanced countries, the study analyzes the risk of "social dominance", where social expenditures dominate fiscal policy, and undermine growth and fiscal sustainability. We scrutinize this risk by analyzing...

Using a firm-bank panel of more than 1m German firms over 2010-2016, we document that local public bank lending to municipalities crowds out private investment. Our results show how crowding out can happen in a developed economy characterized by low interest rates and fiscal austerity. Our...

We propose a model that delivers endogenous variations in term spreads driven primarily by banks’ portfolio decision and their appetite to bear the risk of maturity transformation. We first show that fluctuations of the future profitability of banks’ portfolios affect their ability to cover...

Conventional wisdom argues that environmental policy is less costly if environmental policy induces the development of cleaner technologies. In contrast to this argument, we show that the cost of environmental policy (a reduction in emissions) may be larger with induced technical change than...

We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...

Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...

In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agents̕ payoff is the weighted sum of the users ̕shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users ̕heterogeneity the game leads to an...

The motivation crowding effect suggests that an external intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different indentifiable conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. As of today, the theoretical \lang1033 possibility of crowding effects is widely accepted...