Venture capitalists not only finance but also advise and thereby add value to young innovative firms. The prospects of venture capital backed firms thus depend on joint efforts of entrepreneurs and informed venture capitalists, and are subject to double moral hazard. In financing a portfolio of...

This paper considers the implications of asymmetric information in capital markets for entrepreneurial entry and tax policy. In many countries, governments subsidize the creation of new firms. One possible justification for these subsidies is that capital markets for the financing of new firms...

This paper surveys the various forms of market failure that can arise when innovating entrepreneurs consider entering an industry, and outlines possible implications for public policy. Externalities can arise from entrepreneurial activities such as spillover benefits from new innovations and...

A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm s success, but neither...

The paper introduces a model of enterprise formation in a unionized economy with labor protection and wage bargaining. Enterprise formation is subject to future market risk and is shaped by labor market institutions in the post-entry stage. The predictions of the model are tested in...