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Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply : analysis and an example

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2011

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011305

Individual and developmental differences in the relationship of preferences and theory of mind

Leipold, Kristina; Vetter, Nora C.; Dittrich, Marcus; … - 2012

Theory of mind and individual preferences are important determinants in social decision making. The current study … examined in a large sample whether being a cooperative preference type is related with better theory of mind skills …. Furthermore, by testing adolescents and adults, we examined the impact of age on this relation. Theory of mind is measured in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689352

Why not in your backyard? : on the location and size of a public facility

Bellettini, Giorgio (contributor); Kempf, Hubert (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003662234

Members, joiners, free-riders, supporters

Ansink, Erik; Withagen, Cees - 2016

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444079

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

A paradox of coalition building in public good provision

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Hattori, Keisuke - 2021

This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision of global public goods. We show that the possibility of future interstate (partial) coordination may hinder the current adoption of better technology by a country outside the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643560

Co-financing agreements and reciprocity : when "no deal" is a good deal

Jang, Dooseok; Patel, Amrish; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016

Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not in the way one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568751

Public goods provision with rent-extracting administrators

Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Grimm, Veronika; … - 2017

This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778679

Homo oeconomicus as the homo moralis' party pooper : heterogenous morality in public good games

Eichner, Thomas; Runkel, Marco - 2024

The main insight of this paper is that moral behavior does not necessarily alleviate coordination problems or may even worsen them, if individuals possess different degrees of morality. We characterize heterogenous Alger-Weibull morality preferences in a canonical model of voluntary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014632345

Is there a dividend of democracy? : experimental evidence from cooperation games

Markussen, Thomas; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2023

Do democratically chosen rules lead to more cooperation and, hence, higher efficiency, than imposed rules? To discuss when such a "dividend of democracy" obtains, we review experimental studies in which material incentives remain stacked against cooperation (i.e., free-riding incentives prevail)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014334071

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