We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a...

Shipping goods internationally is risky and takes time. To allocate risk and to finance the time gap between production and sale, a range of payment contracts is utilized. I study the optimal choice between these payment contracts considering one shot transactions, repeated transactions and...

This paper introduces finance or credit in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (DSK) model of international trade. It identifies mechanisms by which finance can affect the main results of the conventional model. The key results are as follows. Perfect credit market does not affect number of varieties or...

We present a unified treatment of optimal trade policy for a small country. The well-known results for duopoly and competitive markets emerge as benchmark cases of our model. In addition, we show that changes in market structure have non-monotonic effects on optimal tariffs. Our results suggest...

This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a third market. I...

This paper examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Welfare-maximizing national governments have the option to discriminate against energy from fossil fuels by subsidizing green energy,...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally,...