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Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2021

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated …). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in … prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599052

More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance

Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015

In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303

Utilities included : split incentives in commercial electricity contracts

Jessoe, Katrina; Papineau, Maya; Rapson, David - 2019

This paper quantifies a tenant-side "split incentives" problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers … previous split incentives papers, and is robust when exposed to several opportunities to fail. The electricity reduction in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012031116

Non-common priors, incentives, and promotions : the role of learning

Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - 2023

We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070

Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Huffman, David; Raymond, Collin - 2023

rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014309731

The incentive compatibility condition, firm culture, and social norms under moral hazard : theory and evidence

Dhami, Sanjit S.; Wei, Mengxing - 2024

In a principal-agent model under moral hazard we examine the psychological and social motivations of the agent that influence the incentive compatibility condition (ICC) of the agent. Under “firm culture” firms emphasize that high effort is consistent with its culture. Under “industry-wide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015071165

Financial constraints and moral hazard : the case of franchising

Fan, Ying; Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine - 2013

Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010210716