The idea that environmental trade policy may be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive tree-trade. This paper reconsiders the issue of strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure...

Circular Economy literature recommends longer lasting products, in order to reduce pollution from extraction, production, and disposal. Our economic analysis finds conditions where consumers choose lives that are too short - a "durability gap". Then policies targeting durability raise welfare....

Economic models of climate policy (or policies to combat other environmental problems) typically neglect psychological adaptation to changing life circumstances. People may adapt or become more sensitive, to different degrees, to a deteriorated environment. The present paper addresses these...

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more...

Carbon tariffs are one prominently discussed environmental policy. The proponents stress the carbon tariffs' ability to mitigate the potential negative effect of environmental-friendly production on competitiveness, to avoid carbon leakage and to reduce world carbon emissions. We analyze the...

We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be...

We study the importance of uncertainty and public finance to the welfare ranking of three environmental policy instruments: pollution taxes, pollution permits and Kyoto-like numerical rules for emissions. The setup is the basic stochastic neoclassical growth model augmented with the assumptions...

We study optimal pollution abatement under a mixed oligopoly game when firms engage in emissions-reducing R&D that is imperfectly appropriable. The regulator uses a tax to curb emissions. Results show that in a mixed oligopoly, the public firm has positive emissions reduction in equilibrium;...

We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken sequentially by private producers and the public sector. We characterize the Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and...

In our analytical general equilibrium model where two polluting inputs can be substitutes or complements in production, we study the effects of a tax on one pollutant in two cases: one where both pollutants face taxes and the second where the other pollutant is subject to a permit policy. In...