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This study exploits the confiscation and auctioning off of Church property that occurred during the French Revolution to assess the role played by transaction costs in delaying the reallocation of property rights in the aftermath of fundamental institutional reform. French districts with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299758
This paper studies R&D investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry and subject to technical uncertainty. We distinguish four scenarios: inevitable entry, entry deterrence, entry blockade, and non-credible entry threat. The entry threat stimulates the incumbent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002576613
We study contestability in non-profit markets when non-commercial providers supply a homogeneous collective good through increasing-returns-to-scale technologies. Unlike in the case of for-profit competition, in the non-profit case the absence of price-based sales contracts means that fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418091
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In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720829
Two-player infinitely-repeated-entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent facing a hit and run entrant. Rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402410
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. -- Colonel Blotto ; conflict resolution ; contest theory ; multi-dimensional resource allocation ; rent-seeking ; experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854423
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718621