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Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply : analysis and an example

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2011

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011305

Individual and developmental differences in the relationship of preferences and theory of mind

Leipold, Kristina; Vetter, Nora C.; Dittrich, Marcus; … - 2012

Theory of mind and individual preferences are important determinants in social decision making. The current study … examined in a large sample whether being a cooperative preference type is related with better theory of mind skills …. Furthermore, by testing adolescents and adults, we examined the impact of age on this relation. Theory of mind is measured in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689352

Why not in your backyard? : on the location and size of a public facility

Bellettini, Giorgio (contributor); Kempf, Hubert (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003662234

Information aggregation in democratic mechanisms

Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans - 2016 - This version: January 22, 2016

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444451

Democratic provision of divisible public goods

Gersbach, Hans - 2010

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937264

Even small trade costs restore efficiency in tax competition

Becker, Johannes; Runkel, Marco - 2010

We introduce transport cost of trade in products into the classical Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model of capital tax competition. It turns out that even small levels of transport cost lead to a complete breakdown of the seminal result, the underprovision of public goods. Instead, there is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008698403

Multinational capital structure and tax competition

Wrede, Matthias - 2010

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966551

The Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2013

We characterize the Pareto-frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. We show how the second-best frontier which incorporates incentive constraints due to private information on productive abilities relates to the first-best frontier which takes only resource constraints into...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126414

Tax-Competition with Involuntary Unemployment

Eichner, Thomas; Bayındır-Upmann, Thorsten - 2010

In the present paper we extend the classical tax-competition framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by modelling involuntary unemployment and by allowing for labour taxation as a second source of public funds. For a large class of production functions (including CES), it turns out that tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003967767

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

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